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The effect of dynamic proximity cues on counterfactual plausibility
Judith Covey∗ Qiyuan Zhang†
Abstract
Previous research has found that people consult closeness or proximity cues when they evaluate the plausibility or
likelihood of a counterfactual alternative to reality. In this paper we asked whether the plausibility of counterfactuals
extends to dynamic proximity cues that signal a sense of propensity or acceleration in the lead-up to an outcome. Subjects
gambled on obtaining either three heads or three tails from three coin-flips. When they lost the gamble they thought it was
more likely that they could have won if they had lost on the third coin-flip that was revealed rather than the first or second
coin-flip. We discuss how the sense of propensity was raised prior to the revelation of the final decisive losing coin-flip
which created a perception of psychological momentum towards winning. Moreover, the consequence of this propensity
effect was to positively bias perceptions of the likelihood of the counterfactual winning outcome.
Keywords: counterfactual potency, near-miss, close counterfactuals, proximity heuristic, temporal-order effect, propensity
effect.
1 Introduction
People often reflect upon how things might have turned
out differently particularly when they have just missed out
on a desired counterfactual outcome (Byrne, 2007; Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1982; Roese, 1997). Moreover, the
closeness or proximity of the near-miss has been shown
to amplify emotions such as feeling unlucky, disappointed
or distressed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; McMullen
& Markman, 2002; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992;
Zhang & Covey, 2014). Close counterfactuals are po-
tent because it is easy to imagine how things could have
turned out differently and when the comparison to re-
ality is salient an affective contrast effect is produced
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kühberger, Groβbichler,
& Wimmer, 2011; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Petro-
celli, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011; Teigen, 1998, 2005).
For instance, a recent experiment conducted by Zhang and
Covey (2014) found that the loser of a basketball-throwing
competition beaten by 1 point rather than 15 points was
judged as more likely to have won the game and they also
felt worse about the outcome.
Counterfactual closeness is usually conceptualised in
terms of the static or end-point proximity between the ac-
tual outcome and the desired counterfactual alternative—
i.e., how many points a game has been lost by (McMullen
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& Markman, 2002; Zhang & Covey, 2014), how many
minutes a plane has been missed by (Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1982), or how long ago an insurance policy lapsed
(Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992). We propose that
counterfactual closeness can also be affected by the dy-
namic proximity profile that precedes the end-point out-
come. For example, members of the losing team of a bas-
ketball game may feel closer to winning if their dynamic
proximity profile showed a reducing deficit towards the
end of the game rather than an unchanging deficit through-
out the game. The former type of profile signals progres-
sion or acceleration, which creates a sense of propensity
or psychological momentum towards the focal outcome
(Kahneman & Varey, 1990; Markman & Guenther 2007).
The focal outcome seems so strongly inevitable that
it can reverse the hindsight bias: Roese, Fessel, Sum-
merville, Kruger and Dilich (2006) found that, when
the perception of trajectory towards an outcome is made
highly salient through the use of dynamic stimuli (i.e.,
computer animations of traffic accidents) likelihood es-
timates of a serious accident were higher when subjects
were not made aware that this was the actual outcome.
The sense of propensity created a feeling of knowing that
the car is about to have an accident, which inflated the
perceived likelihood of that outcome. However, it remains
untested whether or not this feeling of knowing will also
carry over to situations where that focal outcome does not
occur. The propensity effect might also intensify feelings
that things could have turned out differently, and this pre-
diction was tested in the current paper.
In our first test of this prediction, we presented subjects
with two different stories about a horse race. In both ver-
sions of the story a racehorse stumbled right before the
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finishing line and lost the race by a tight margin. In one
version, the horse had been consistently following behind
the leader before it stumbled, whereas in the other version
the horse fell behind in the early stage of the race but had
been catching up with the leader when it stumbled. We
found that subjects who read the second version thought
it was more likely that the horse could have won the race,
despite the fact that horse lost the race by the same dis-
tance in both versions. The fact that the horse was catch-
ing up with the leader therefore created a stronger sense of
propensity and winning was a more plausible counterfac-
tual1.
Of course, the propensity effect might not be restricted
to circumstances where the dynamic proximity profile is
represented by physical distance cues. Distance can also
be conceptualised in terms of the number of antecedent
outcomes that need to be satisfied to reach a focal out-
come. For instance, if someone needs to draw five cards
of the same suit from a deck, they are closer to winning
if they have drawn four cards of the same suit than if they
have drawn three cards. However, even if four cards of
the same suit are drawn the sense of propensity towards
winning might also depend upon the temporal order of the
card draw.
According to Kahneman and Varey (1990), decisive
events that occur late in a causal sequence disrupt the
sense of propensity that has been built up. They are also
more likely to be mutated in counterfactual thinking and
given stronger causal significance (Byrne, Segura, Cul-
hane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & Gunasegaram,
1990; Spellman, 1997; Walsh & Byrne 2004). Hence, the
perceived plausibility of the counterfactual “I could have
drawn five hearts” will be higher if four hearts were drawn
first, followed by a spade rather than one spade drawn first
followed by four hearts. In the former case the cards are
revealed in an order that builds up a sense of propensity
that “I am winning” while in the latter case this sense of
propensity is disrupted by a heart being drawn second.
The aim of this experiment was to test this temporal or-
der effect using a task where subjects gambled real money
in a computerised coin-flipping game. In each trial, sub-
jects flipped three coins shown on screen from left to right
(hereafter labelled coin 1—coin 2—coin 3) and would win
if the three coins stopped at the same value (i.e., H-H-H
or T-T-T) but would lose for any other combination. In a
between-subjects design the outcomes of all three coin-
flips were either revealed simultaneously (Simultaneous
condition) or sequentially from left to right (Sequential
condition).
The possible outcomes of the coin-flipping task fall into
four types: Win (H-H-H, T-T-T), Lose on coin 1 (H-T-T, T-
H-H), Lose on coin 2 (H-T-H, T-H-T), and Lose on coin 3
1Further details about the methodology and findings of this experi-
ment can be provided on request from the corresponding author.
(H-H-T, T-T-H). Hence, if subjects lost, they were always
one coin away from winning and the end-point proximity
to winning was equal. We predicted, however, that the dif-
ferent types of losing trials would lead to different percep-
tions of propensity towards winning. But this effect should
only occur when the outcomes were revealed sequentially.
In both the Simultaneous and Sequential conditions the
chance of winning was always 25% before any coin-flips
are revealed. In the Simultaneous condition this chance
either rises to 100% (Win trials) or drops to 0% (all types
of Lose trials) after all three coin-flips are revealed. There
is therefore no variation in the sense of propensity towards
winning between the three different types of losing trials,
and we would therefore expect that the “I could have won”
counterfactual will be equally potent.
However, in the Sequential condition we did expect dif-
ferences in counterfactual potency between the different
types of losing trials. After the outcome of coin 1 is re-
vealed, the chance of winning remains at 25% no matter
whether it is a head or tail. However, in the Lose on coin 3
trials (H-H-T, T-T-H), the value of coin 2 matches that of
coin 1 raising the chance of winning to 50%. This chance
then drops to 0% when coin 3 fails to match the first two.
In contrast, in the Lose on coin 1 (T-H-H, H-T-T) or Lose
on coin 2 (H-T-H, T-H-T) trials, the sense of propensity is
disrupted when the value of coin 2 fails to match coin 1,
causing the chance of winning to drop from 25% to 0%. It
was therefore predicted that the sense of propensity would
be strongest for Lose on coin 3 trials which we expected to
produce higher counterfactual probability estimates than
either Lose on coin 1 or Lose on coin 2 trials.
Because subjects in this experiment were playing the
game with real money we examined not only their emo-
tional responses to the loss but also how the near miss
affected their perceptions of being lucky or unlucky and
their subsequent betting strategies. As discussed pre-
viously, outcome closeness has been found to be a de-
terminant of counterfactually driven negative emotions
like disappointment through an affective contrast mecha-
nism (Markman & McMullen, 2003; McMullen & Mark-
man, 2002). Close counterfactuals have also been found
to affect perceptions of luck and subsequent risk-taking
(Teigen, 1996; Wohl & Enzle, 2003; Wu, van Dijk, &
Clark, 2014). Wohl and Enzle (2003) for example found
that subjects who experienced a near big win on a roulette
game perceived themselves to be less lucky than subjects
who experienced a near big loss. They also bet less on the
next game. We therefore expected that when subjects have
lost on trials which have increased counterfactual potency
(i.e., Lose on coin 3 trials in the Sequential condition),
the starker contrast between the reality (“I lost this trial”)
and what might have been (“I could have won this trial”)
would heighten feelings of disappointment and being un-
lucky and reduce the amount bet on the next trial.
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Figure 1: Coin-flipping simulation program interface.
2 Method
2.1 Subjects
Eighty two first year psychology undergraduates from
Durham University were recruited (14 males and 68 fe-
males) and were given £2 to gamble in a computer-
simulated coin-flipping game and kept whatever was left
at the end of the experiment. Subjects also received either
course credits or an additional £2 for taking part.
2.2 Materials and procedure
Subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to
investigate people’s gambling behaviours. Having given
written consent to taking part in the experiment, they
were each led into a two-square-metre isolated cubical and
seated before a computer.
After the programme was launched, subjects were in-
structed to press the “space” key to start four practice tri-
als before proceeding to the 80 experimental trials (with
a break provided after 40 trials). In each trial, subjects
completed four actions in succession: Bet—Flip—Lock—
Answer. All instructions were provided on screen.
Bet. As shown in Figure 1, subjects started with 2000
credits (equivalent to £2) and used the “up” or “down”
keys to adjust the amount of credits they wished to bet
starting from a default amount of 1 credit for the first trial.
On subsequent trials the starting amount was the number
of credits placed on the previous trial. The amount bet was
displayed in a box on the bottom-right of the screen and
the frame of the box changed from black to red to remind
subjects to adjust their bets at the beginning of each trial
with the total remaining credits displayed in the bottom-
left corner. The minimum bet was 1 credit and the maxi-
mum was 25. This limit ensured that subjects would not
be in deficit after 80 trials even if they lost every trial.
Flip and Lock. After placing their bets, subjects were
instructed to press the “space” key to start flipping the
three coins shown from left to right. The pre-flipping
value assigned to each coin was randomized for each trial.
In the Revelation: Sequential condition, subjects pressed
the “space” key once to start the three coins flipping (at
45msec per flip) at the same time. Then they pressed the
“space” key three times in sequence to stop the coins flip-
ping one by one from left to right. In comparison, in the
Revelation: Simultaneous condition, subjects pressed the
“space” key three times in sequence to make the three
coins start flipping (at 45msec per flip) one by one from
left to right. Then they pressed the “space” key a fourth
time to stop all three coins flipping at the same time. In
both conditions, the minimum interval between the presses
of the “space” key was one second to prevent subjects
from pressing the key too quickly. The outcome each coin
flip was NOT pre-programmed and was determined by the
moment at which subjects pressed the “space” key. In both
conditions, if all three coins showed the same value (H-H-
H or T-T-T), the words “Congratulations, you won” would
appear on screen and subjects won three times the amount
bet on that trial. Otherwise, the words “Sorry, you didn’t
win this time” would appear on screen and they lost the
full amount of their bet.
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Answer. At the end of each trial, subjects were in-
structed to press the “space” key to bring up two ques-
tions determined by the outcome of the trial. On winning
trials they were asked two filler questions (“To what ex-
tent do you agree with the following statement: I could
have lost this trial” (1 = Strongly disagree, 9 = Strongly
agree); “How pleased are you regarding the result of this
trial” (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely). On losing tri-
als the first question asked was drawn in sequence from
a pool of four questions: counterfactual probability esti-
mate (“I could have won this trial?” 1 = Strongly dis-
agree; 9 = Strongly agree); disappointment rating (“How
disappointed are you regarding the result of this trial?” 1
= Not at all; 9 = Extremely); luck rating (“How lucky or
unlucky do you think you were in this trial” 1 = Extremely
unlucky, 9 = Extremely lucky); and a memory test (“How
many heads/ tails have you got in this trial” ‘0 heads’-‘3
heads’—scored as 0=incorrect, 1=correct). Since a cor-
rect answer to this memory question required attention to
all three coin-flips, we expected that in the Sequential con-
dition memory scores would be highest in the Lose on coin
3 trials. This is because, in the Lose on coin 1 or Lose on
coin 2 trials, the game has been lost on the second coin-
flip and there is no need for the subject to pay attention to
the third coin-flip. No differences in memory test scores
were expected in the Simultaneous condition, because the
outcome of all three coin-flips is processed holistically.
The second question was a filler question in which sub-
jects rated their agreement or disagreement with one of
six statements: “I should change the current strategy for
pressing buttons”; “I should stick to the current strategy
for pressing buttons”; “I’ve been very lucky so far”; “I’ve
been very unlucky so far”; “I’ve seen more heads than tails
so far”; “I’ve seen more tails than heads so far”.
At the end of the 80 trials subjects exchanged their
credit balance for real money. Then they were given a
written debrief and thanked for their contribution.
Results
The means and standard deviations (SDs) of the scores
for each target question2 and results of the Type of los-
ing trial (Lose on coin 1/23 vs. Lose on coin 3) x Reve-
lation (Simultaneous vs. Sequential) analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) are shown in Table 1. Simple main effect sizes
2The four target questions appeared on average around five times af-
ter each type of trial and all available scores were averaged to yield an
overall score for each subject. Other extracting methods (e.g., averaging
the first three scores, first four, first five and so forth) produced the same
results for all analyses.
3No significant differences on any of the four target questions were
found between means in the Lose on coin 2 and Lose on coin 1 trials
in either the Sequential or Simultaneous conditions (t(40) ≤ 1.68, p ≥
.101). The scores for these two types of trials were therefore pooled.
Table 1: Means (SDs) for each target question as a func-
tion of the Type of trial (Lose on coin 1/2 vs. Lose on
coin 3) and Revelation (Sequential vs. Simultaneous) con-
dition.
Sequential Simultaneous
MEMORY TEST (0=incorrect, 1=correct)
Lose on coin 1/2 0.73 (0.17) 0.70 (0.19)
Lose on coin 3 0.81 (0.20) 0.68 (0.25)
Simple main effectsa η2
p
= .116∗ η2
p
= .004
Revelation x Type of
trial
F(1,80) = 3.74, η2
p
= .045,
p = .057†
COUNTERFACTUAL PROBABILITY (1=strongly
disagree, 9=strongly agree “I could have won”).
Lose on coin 1/2 5.76 (1.89) 5.90 (1.19)
Lose on coin 3 6.43 (1.63) 5.92 (1.21)
Simple main effects η2
p
= .264∗∗ η2
p
= .002
Revelation x Type of
trial
F(1,80) = 11.3, η2
p
= .124,
p =.001∗∗
DISAPPOINTMENT (1=not at all, 9=extremely
disappointed)
Lose on coin 1/2 5.84 (1.61) 4.87 (1.67)
Lose on coin 3 6.24 (1.53) 5.05 (1.76)
Simple main effectsa η2
p
= .168∗∗ η2
p
= .054
Revelation x Type of
trial
F(1, 40) = 1.47, η2
p
= .018,
p =.229
LUCK (1=extremely unlucky, 9=extremely lucky)
Lose on coin 1/2 3.66 (0.80) 3.83 (0.96)
Lose on coin 3 3.51 (1.08) 3.82 (1.03)
Simple main effects η2
p
= .027 η2
p
< .001
Revelation x Type of
trial
F(1, 40) = 0.70, η2
p
= .009,
p =.404.
† p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p <.01.
a Although the simple main effect test is significant in
the Sequential condition but not the Simultaneous
condition the change in the simple main effect between
the two revelation conditions (i.e., the Revelation x
Type of trial interaction) is not significant at the 5%
level.
are also reported to illustrate the effects of the Type of los-
ing trial within each revelation condition. We expected
that the Type of losing trial would affect the scores only
when the outcomes of the coin-flipping were revealed se-
quentially rather than simultaneously. Lose on coin 3 trials
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Table 2: Mean (SD) change in amounts bet after each type
of trial.
Sequential Simultaneous
Lose on coin 1/2 −0.127
(0.52)
+0.267
(0.74)
Lose on coin 3 −0.049
(0.63)
+0.123
(1.03)
Simple main effects η2
p
= .011 η2
p
= .019
Revelation x Type of trial
(Lose on coin 1/2 vs. Lose
on coin 3)
F(1,80) = 1.20, η2
p
= .015,
p = .276
Win +0.468
(1.18)
−0.476
(2.27)
Lose on coin 1/2/3 −0.101
(0.431)
+0.219
(0.687)
Simple main effects η2
p
= .118∗ η2
p
= .055
Revelation x Type of trial
(Win vs. Lose 1/2/3)
F(1,80) = 5.96, η2
p
= .069,
p =.017
∗ p < .05.
were expected to increase memory test scores, counterfac-
tual probability estimates, and disappointment ratings and
reduce luck ratings—but only in the Sequential condition.
The means and simple main effect sizes shown in Table
1 support these expectations for all scores apart from the
luck ratings. Whereas the simple main effect sizes for the
counterfactual probability estimates, memory test scores
and disappointment ratings were significant in the Sequen-
tial condition (η2
p
≥ .116, p ≤ .027), they were not signif-
icant in the Simultaneous condition (η2
p
≤.054, p ≥ .139).
Although this pattern of results provides support for our
suggestion that the method used to reveal the outcomes
of the coin-flips contributed towards creating a sense of
propensity to win, it should be noted that the Type of trial
x Revelation interaction was significant only for the coun-
terfactual probability estimates (F(1,80) = 11.3, η2
p
= .124,
p = .001). The interaction did not reach significance for
the disappointment ratings (F(1, 40) = 1.47, η2
p
= .018, p =
.229), or the memory test scores (F(1,80) = 3.74, η2
p
= .045,
p = .057). The observed differences in the significance of
the simple main effects between the revelation conditions
for these two measures must therefore be interpreted with
caution.
There was no evidence from the findings shown in Ta-
ble 2 that the stronger near-miss signal evoked by the Lose
on coin 3 trials in the Sequential condition led to a greater
reduction in the amounts bet on the next trial. The Revela-
tion x Type of trial (Lose on 1/2 vs. Lose on 3) interaction
was not significant and simple main effects tests confirmed
that there was no significant difference between the Lose
on coin 3 and Lose on coin 1/2 conditions in either the
Sequential or Simultaneous conditions.
There were however some notable differences between
the Sequential and Simultaneous conditions in how bets
were changed following winning or losing trials confirmed
by a significant Revelation x Type of trial (Win vs. Lose
1/2/3) interaction. More specifically, subjects in the Se-
quential condition raised their bets after winning trials and
reduced them after losing trials, whereas subjects in the
Simultaneous condition reduced their bets after winning
trials and increased them after losing trials.
This asymmetry in subjects’ betting strategy could re-
flect the possibility that the Sequential condition evoked
more of an illusion of control over the outcome of the trial.
Subjects were more actively involved in the game—they
chose exactly when each coin stopped flipping by pressing
the “space” bar three times in succession. Hence, a “hot
hand” illusion of being a winner may have been evoked af-
ter a winning trial (resulting in an increase in the amount
bet on the next trial) whereas a “cold hand” illusion of
being a loser may have been evoked after a losing trial (re-
sulting in an decrease in the amount bet on the next trial)
(Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). This explanation
is consistent with Langer’s (1975) theory, which identified
active/passive involvement as one of the dimensions that
determines the extent to which an event is perceived as
controllable. The Simultaneous condition may not how-
ever have evoked the same illusion of control over the out-
comes of the trials because, although subjects chose when
each coin started flipping by pressing the “space” bar three
times in succession, they had to press the “space” bar only
once to stop them flipping. Their betting strategy in this
condition was therefore more consistent with the belief
that the game was a game of chance rather than a game
of skill—and the fact that they reduced their bet after a
win but increased it after a loss suggests that they may
have been susceptible to another type of cognitive bias—
the gambler’s fallacy, where a win is perceived as less
likely to follow a winning trial than a losing trial (Sundali
& Croson, 2006).
3 Discussion
Research has shown that counterfactuals are stronger and
emotional reactions intensified when an outcome is prox-
imate to its counterfactual alternative. The present paper
extended this notion of static or end-point proximity by
testing the effects of dynamic proximity cues at creating a
sense of propensity towards outcomes that are not realised.
Our first demonstration created a sense of propensity using
dynamic cues which signalled acceleration or progression.
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A racehorse rapidly catching up with the leader of the race
was seen as a more likely winner. We built upon that result
in the coin-flipping experiment by showing that a sense
of propensity was not restricted to dynamically changing
distance cues. Propensity towards winning a coin-flipping
game was induced by varying the order in which the de-
cisive coin-flip was revealed. The counterfactual (“I could
have won”) was rated more likely when the decisive coin-
flip was revealed late in the sequence (e.g., losing on the
third coin), compared to when it was revealed early (e.g.,
losing on the first or second coin).
It is worth noting of course that subjects have no ra-
tional basis for their counterfactual probability estimates
to be higher when the losing coin is revealed third in the
sequence rather than first or second. If a subject sees
two heads and a tail, the counterfactual “I could have
won” should be equally likely regardless of the order in
which the outcomes of the three coins are revealed. We
have therefore identified a new way in which the sense of
propensity can bias probability judgments. The propensity
effect can bias not only prospective judgments of factual
outcomes (as demonstrated by Roese et al., 2006) but also
retrospective judgments of counterfactual outcomes.
This bias could of course have real-life implications,
given the way that casino slot-machines can be designed.
As discovered by Strickland and Grote (1967) a slot ma-
chine which reveals the outcomes of the three wheels se-
quentially from left to right usually has the highest propor-
tion of winning symbols on the first wheel, a lower pro-
portion on the second wheel, and the lowest proportion on
the third wheel. This particular design therefore has the
potential to create a sense of propensity towards winning
which may help explain why, as suggested by Strickland
and Grote (1967), it can lead to more persistent gambling.
As well as identifying the ways in which people’s prob-
ability judgments can be misled, future research might
also examine the relative and combined influence of differ-
ent types of static and dynamic proximity cues on counter-
factual plausibility. For example, we might ask ourselves
how the proximity effects created by static end-point dis-
tance cues (e.g., the distance between the losing horse and
the winner or the total number of heads and tails flipped)
combine with or compete against the sense of propensity
or psychological momentum produced by dynamic prox-
imity cues (e.g., the acceleration or velocity of the horse in
catching up with the leader or the sequence of heads and
tails flipped). There is every reason to expect an interplay
between static and dynamic proximity cues in creating a
sense of counterfactual closeness in the same way that out-
come satisfaction has been shown to depend upon both
the actual outcome position and the velocity of the out-
come changes (Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Hsee, Salovey, &
Abelson, 1994). Research by Hsee and his colleagues has
shown that people’s satisfaction with stock performance
was determined not only by the how much the stock’s
value had changed (i.e., displacement) but also by how
quickly the value changed over time (i.e., rate of change).
In summing up, the present research represents a step
forward in refining our notion of close counterfactuals be-
yond static measures of distance or proximity. As dis-
cussed by Kühberger et al. (2011, p.154) closeness effects
rely upon people interpreting the situation as “coming as
close as possible”. This requires the margin of miss to be
evaluated relative to a perceptually salient and cognitively
accessible reference value. They used the notion of a cat-
egorical boundary as a reference value and discussed the
ways in which vignette content and study design might
heighten the feeling of nearly making it. The present
findings advance this theorising by delineating the con-
tribution that dynamic proximity cues make in signaling
progression towards the categorical boundary and thereby
increasing the sense that the counterfactual almost hap-
pened.
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